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Abstract-Some of the ideas nascent in the notion of a model are here explored in a 
preliminary way. In particular we ask what the special insight afforded by the mathe- 
matical model may be and suggest that the notion of craftsmanship in mathematical 
modelling can provide a via media between the formalistic and subjective extremes, at 
once doing justice to the modeller’s mental activity and providing a basis for dialogue 
and discussion. 
We do not use the word “mere” in the sense of that notion of a model at which the hard- 
core empiricist would throw up his hands. For the word “mere” is patient of almost 
opposite meanings [ll. On the one hand it can mean “having no greater extent, range, 
value or power”; on the other it is what it is in the fullest sense of the term, i.e, “nothing 
short of.” It is in the latter sense that we would wish to approach the notion of the model 
to try and see it in its plentitude. No doubt this issue and the future issues of this journal 
will contain many distinguished analyses of particular situations in the form of mathe- 
matical models of varying validity and sophistication. Nevertheless we feel that it is 
worthwhile to lay out some of the philosophical considerations that underlie the whole 
business of mathematical modelling. It is not that the mathematical modeller needs to be 
a full-time philosopher, or should attend to the process of forming a mathematical mode1 
in the sense of being consciously aware of the philosophic issues involved. It is rather that 
all who practice the craft of mathematical modelling can benefit by a certain reflection on 
the underlying notions of the subject. Without such reflections it is Ldeed possible to get 
into a measure of confusion about the modelling process. We do not claim to have the 
last word on the notion of models and modelling, but rather would put forward the 
following contentions in all modesty as suggestive topics which will bear further discus- 
sion and elucidation. 
1. THE RISE OF MATHEMATICbL MODELLING 
The extent to which mathematical modelling has become self-conscious is in itself a 
phenomenon of interest. Like Monsieur Jourdain, mathematicians have been modelling 
for centuries without perhaps recognizing it as their prose. The last few years have seen 
two international symposia [2], the publication of a number of different books [3-8, to 
give only a sample] and the founding of journals specifically devoted to mathematical 
modelling [9-101. Two encouraging features seem to mark this development. One is the 
transdisciplinary nature of the enterprise and the other the recognition of the limitations 
Dr. Aris is with the Department of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science; Prof. Penn is with the 
University College and Department of Anthropology. 
2 R. Am AND M. PENN 
of the process by its own practitioners. It thus may be hoped to conduce to the greater 
affinity and mutual understanding of different departments of learning, and it is to be 
hoped also that its progress will not be hampered by the resistance which exaggerated 
claims inevitably produce. 
Evidence of this appears constantly. For example, a symposium on “Mathematical 
Modelling and its Relevance to the Teaching of Mathematics in Higher Education” was 
sponsored by the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications at the beginning of 1979. 
The papers published in the Bulletin of the I.M.A. are of interest in themselves. In the 
first of these, on “Learning to Use Mathematics” by H. Burkhardt [ill, a framework is 
made for discussing the teaching of mathematical modelling. This is described as 
“tackling realistic problems from outside of mathematics.” The kind of problem that 
arises in this context is distinguished from the traditional mathematical example by the 
emphasis that it places on the formulation and on the objective. The objective is not just 
an exercise in mathematics as learnt but is the solution or understanding of some pro- 
totypical problem. There is an analogy here perhaps with the teaching of languages where 
in the old style short exercises were made up with sentences which would test the stu- 
dents’ grasp of the immediately preceeding grammar or syntax. In contrast to this some 
recent texts have endeavored to use the literature of the language itself to instruct the 
student in the syntactical and grammatical complexities of the language. R. R. McLone 
1121 called attention to the report on the “Training of Mathematicians” [19731 in his 
discussion of the teaching of mathematical modelling. This report emphasized that math- 
ematicians practicing their craft in industry saw a greater role for “mathematical mo- 
delling” in their work than had been communicated to them in their education. He points 
out that all seem to agree that mathematical modelling is more of the nature of an activity 
than a body of knowledge to be mastered, and goes on to enumerate the skills that are 
required under the headings of “manipulative,” “discovery,” “critical,” and “com- 
municative.” Under the first he recognizes the need for the acquisition of basic tech- 
niques, the standard use of these and the extrapolation of them into unfamiliar situations. 
Under the second he notes the need for improvisation of new techniques to meet a 
particular situation, the abstraction that often brings together in a unified way diverse 
problems and the very formulation of problems themselves. Under the heading of 
“critical” he calls attention to the need for organization of material from standard 
sources, the assessment of suitability of different methods and the need to be critical of 
one’s own work as well as its sources. The communicative skills include the communi- 
cation of ideas to mathematicians and nonmathematicians and the effective working to- 
gether in groups. Indeed the instruction which he favors is of the nature of a mathematical 
laboratory course. D. Saunders [121 called attention to the course on mathematical mo- 
delling which is included in the Open University offerings. On a more technical vein the 
same issue contains papers by J. G. Andrews on “Mathematical Models in Welding” 
[14]; by D. Burghes on “Mathematical Modelling in Geography and Planning” 1151; and 
by D. M. Burley on “Mathematical Modelling in Biology and Medicine” C161. 
What is particularly of interest here is the way in which the mathematical curriculum 
is being affected. It is not that this emphasis on modelling is entirely new-Ben Noble’s 
book on applications of’undergraduate mathematics in engineering was published in 1967 
[ 171 and had been preceeded by several years of concern by a committee of the American 
Mathematical Society-but its time certainly seems to have arrived. It is not that it has 
not been practiced in disciplines as different as biology 118-231 and geography 124-261, 
but that modelling is becoming more self-conscious and the validity of its approach being 
more widely realized. The literature is already vast and obviously cannot be surveyed 
here; among the chief benefits of the two International Symposia are the impressions 
they give of the scope of mathematical modelling. 
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2. SOME USES OF THE WORD “MODEL” 
The term “model” has been subject to what Bunge calls a “merry confusion of senses” 
and, though he has done as much as anyone to clear up this confusion, there are still 
some ambiguities in the way in which the word is commonly used. Bunge [27,281 rec- 
ognized that there is a “model object” namely a hypothetical sketch of supposed phe- 
nomena, which is to be grafted on to a theoretical model in the process of model making. 
Thus in confronting the simple case of planetary motion, the model object might consist 
of two point masses representing the sum and its satellite. If this is grafted on to the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation there results a Newtonian model of planetary motion. 
On the other hand, if it is treated from the viewpoint of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, 
a relativistic model of a simple planetary system evolves. 
In his paper in the volume edited by Freudenthal, Apostoll291 formalizes the modelling 
relationship as R[S, P, M, Tl which is the relationship in which the subject S takes, with 
a certain purpose P in mind, the entity M as a model for the prototype T. This is 
interesting because it recognizes the role of the modeler, which Apostol calls the 
“subject,” and also brings in the note of purpose. Aris [5] has emphasized that the model 
must be judged in the light of the purpose for which it was constructed and has also given 
some attention to the skill of the modeller. It is important to recognize the personal 
element in the knowledge that might be gained by modelling and we shall return to this 
point later. 
The term “model” is indeed widely used by philosophers of science. Hesse 1301 in 
her excellent little monograph “Models and Analogies in Science” distinguishes two 
basic senses and Leatherdale, in a longer work [31], four. McMullin 1321 has claimed that 
the “most important single question” posed by physics for philosophy is that of deciding 
what “the complex postulated structures of the scientist tell us of the world.” If this 
cla:m can be made for large deliberations on scientific theory, and we believe it can, then 
perhaps the more particular and detailed considerations that arise in the mathematical 
modelling of a specific situation can bring something to the greater question-the tax- 
onomist still needs his microscope. For the range of the word “model” must be recog- 
nized. McMullin can speak of the theory being “about this model and about nothing 
else” using “model” in the broad sense, as when mitosis is held to be a matter of 
exponential growth at a rate conditioned by the availability of nutrients. In the narrower 
sense we have a “model” when that theoretical vision is focussed on a particular situa- 
tion, say of competitive growth in a chemostat. The distinction needs to be recognized, 
but we hesitate to impose it by any stipulation of usage, even for the purposes of this 
paper, lest we add to the profusion--or, “confusion” as Bunge has it-of current uses. 
Speaking loosely, the mathematical model will be the mathematical structure that ties 
the specific situation back into a more general theory (with its associated physical model). 
Its validity as an “explanation” of what is going on in the given situation rests on the 
tripod of: (a) the adequacy of its representation of the situation; (b) its internal correct- 
ness; and (c) the acceptability of the general theory which is involved. Thus a mathe- 
matical model of a tsunami would be unconvincing if it ignored inertial terms, incorrectly 
solved the equations or related itself to astrology rather than continuum mechanics. On 
the other hand, it might with impunity ignore the salinity of the ocean (except in SO far 
as it affects the density) or the relation between continuum mechanics and molecular 
theory. 
3. THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING 
Let us turn to a brief and informal review of the modelling process. It must be pre- 
ceeded by some encounter of the subject or modeller with the phenomenon. This en- 
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counter will be already somewhat mediated by the theoretical viewpoint of the subject. 
At this state this may be very general as for example when a person approaches a new 
phenomenon as something to be explained within the framework of natural science as 
opposed to taking it to be an act of magic. Nothing very much more than a presumption 
of, say, the uniformity of nature may be involved here. Let us suppose however, that the 
modeller in reflecting on the phenomenon conceives a purpose. This might involve an 
application and require constructing a model which would be of value in predicting its 
future behavior. Or, the purpose might simply be to understand the possible mechanisms 
for the phenomenon and tie these back into other known regions of scientific knowledge. 
Having conceived this purpose, the subject returns to the phenomenon with a more 
explicit theoretical viewpoint. It is in keeping with the common use of the term to refer 
to this viewpoint as a “theory.” Thus, for example, the subject might approach the 
phenomenon from the viewpoint of the Newtonian theory of gravitation. This does not 
preclude subsequent modifications on some other theoretical basis for, if the Newtonian 
theory failed to give an adequate model, the subject might, as mentioned above, return 
and approach from the viewpoint of the theory of relativity instead. Our point is that at 
this stage there is some commitment to a theoretical framework within which the mo- 
delling process is to go on. This would seem to correspond to the theoretical model of 
Bunge. 
The modelling comes about when some particular assumptions are made about the 
phenomenon and appropriate methods of description, corresponding to the formulation 
of the model object in Bunge’s terminology. These assumptions are essentially of a 
constitutive nature either concerning the material of the system or the nature of the model 
which is deemed adequate for the purpose. Again there is a strong personal element in 
this, for the skill of a mathematical modeller will be seen in the ease and finesse with 
which these assumptions are made and the way in which an appropriate model evolves. 
Again, there is plenty of room for iteration and for returning to the situation with a slightly 
modified set of assumptions. Nor should we overlook the fact that there may be several 
sets of assumptions which lead to the same model, since in general there is an equivalence 
class of assumptions which connects the phenomenon, viewed in the light of a general 
theory, with the mathematical model. 
This is not unrelated to the observation that any prototype has a subset of character- 
istics that are irrelevant to the modelling process, as the ocean’s salinity might be to the 
hydrodynamics of a tsunami. These adiaphora form, as it were, the kernel of the modelling 
operation which maps the “space” of the prototype onto the “space” of models since 
they are mapped on the null element and so do not appear. 
The mathematical model M is now in existence and from this point has a life of its 
own. The use that may be made of this intrinsic vitality will depend on the purpose for 
which the model was intended and what modifications of that purpose may take place. 
In the simplest case the model may be operated upon to give numbers; as when a solution 
to a differential equation is found, these numbers can be compared with experimental 
observations of the phenomenon itself. The model may be judged adequate, if the agree- 
ment is within experimental error, or inadequate, if it lies outside of a reasonable estimate 
of error. An inadequate model may be reformulated by changing the assumptions under 
which it was constructed. For example, in the modelling of tidal action, it might be found 
that the results from a model incorporating only the influence of the moon would be 
inadequate and a modification of the model would be necessary in which allowance would 
be made for the influence of the sun as well. In other cases the manipulation of the model 
might be minimal. An example of this would be the rendering of the equations dimen- 
sionless so that the important dimensionless numbers (e.g., the Reynolds number from 
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the Navier-Stokes equations) emerge. Another possibility is that the model would suggest 
a totally new purpose for which further manipulation or modification might be necessary. 
For example, if an adequate model of tidal action had been obtained for a smooth coastline 
one might return to this and ask what the effect of promontories and inlets might be. 
Here again the overarching theory is the same but the hypotheses have to be changed. 
In Bunge’s nomenclature the theoretical model stays the same but the model objects 
vary. 
One might ask whether it is possible to construct models without an overarching the- 
ory. The answer would seem to be that this is possible but that the models would remain 
isolated and the general theory would have to be created anew for each individual model. 
Thus the general theory serves as a binding element in the space of models. 
4. MANIPULATIONS WITH THE MODEL 
Once the model is formulated it is open to manipulation which may, as we have just 
noticed, be as slight as a rearrangement or as serious as a total reshaping. Even when the 
next objective is the straightforward solution of certain equations there may be need for 
skill in the approach as Hammersley [33,341 has shown; the preparation of the model and 
the importance of getting a preliminary feel for the solution has also been emphasized by 
Aris [5,3_5,361. 
The internal processes of model reduction may be very drastic yet not change the 
model in essence. Thus a partial differential equation may be reduced to a set of ordinary 
differential equations as a means of finding the numerical values of the solution. This 
calls for the technical skills of the numerical analyst, but can hardly be thought to have 
changed the model. If an analytical solution had been possible it would have been used 
and would, if the discrete approximation had been done properly, have led to the same 
numbers to within the tolerated accuracy. 
In other cases the transformation of a model is accepted, or even cultivated, for the 
light it may shed on the situation, for the value inherent in having an alternative approach 
or even for the sheer aesthetics of variation. Thus in the so-called catalytic monolith a 
large number of fine passages of identical cross-section pass through a block of heat 
conducting material so that they form a system of parallel channels separated by plane 
walls. For simplicity the cross-sections of these channels can be thought of as identical 
squares. If a hot fluid flows into a central passage and cold into all the rest, the hot stream 
will lose its heat to the surrounding streams and the temperatures at the other end of the 
monolith will show a distribution, the central stream still being the hottest with the other 
temperatures decreasing according to their distance from the central passage. In fact a 
formula for T,,,(z), the temperature in the (m,Ir)th passage at a distance z from the inlet, 
can be derived. If T,,,(o) = 1 and T,,,(o) = 0, m,n # 0, we have a “fundamental” 
solution 
1 
T,,,,,(z) = --e~‘1”“1,,,(2rz)1,(2rz) 
a’ 
where 
a = the side of the square 
r = K/Vpc,n2 
K = a transmission coefficient depending on the heat transfer to and through the wall. 
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On the other hand the fundamental solution for heat conduction in a continuous flowing 
medium governed by the equation 
is known to be 
VP% 
T(x,y,z) = 4 exp - 
Vpc,(2 + y”) 
4kz ’ 
where 
V = velocity of fluid 
PC, = heat capacity of fluid. 
What is the relation between these models, the first a rather literal one, the second 
metaphoric in the sense of treating a large number of thin walls and narrow passages as 
if it were a continuum? If a is the length side of square defining each passage we would 
expect that T,,n(z) would approach T(mu,na,z) as a gets small and this can be shown 
[371 to be the case provided k = K. An equivalent continuum conductivity has thus been 
calculated which relates the two distinct models. However, the same asymptotic formulae 
which is used to establish the connection with a different model (the continuous one) 
could be used merely as computational tools within the original (discrete) model to eval- 
uate T,,,(z). 
In this example the reductions involved are highly conventional ones with all the 
dignity of precise asymptotic formulae. Often, however, the situation calls for approaches 
that are much more risque for which the justification is much less certain. Thus Gilles 
1381, for example, exploits the observed stability of form of a temperature wave in a 
packed bed, introduces an artificial, though suitable, set of formulae for its shape that 
allow control calculations that would not otherwise be possible. In these extreme cases 
it is probably better to regard the model as having been changed by the manipulation into 
a new model which could be presented in its own right on the basis of its own assumptions. 
The skillful use of internal manipulation and model transformation is clearly of the 
essence of the craft of modelling. But before expanding on this theme let us review what 
is involved in tying back the model into the prototype. 
5. CONFIRMATION OF THE MODEL 
Though we have emphasized that the model 5; an entity in itself and, if nontrivial, 
deserves study for its own sake, it is often necessary and desirable to relate it in detail 
to the prototype. The most common way of doing this is to calculate some feature of the 
behavior of the model which is thought to be representative of an experimental me:tsure- 
ment made on the prototype. Thus, for example, one might calculate the resonant fre- 
quencies or the critical buckling loads and compare them with experiments. If the ob- 
servations and the calculation agree to within a reasonable error, then one has a certain 
degree of confidence that the model indeed “represents” the system. But there are prob- 
lems with the notion of confirming behavior by means of observation. 
The idea of a model is inherent in certain aspects of evaluating everyday evidence. 
Take, for example, the situation Russell uses to call attention to the difficulty of judging 
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causation by experiment. In two factories widely separated a bell is sounded promptly 
at noon and the workers take a lunch break. From this observation alone it is not clear 
that the bell at A is not the cause of the lunch break at B and vice versa. Indeed one can 
imagine a situation where through lack of facilities at B, the bell is rung by someone 
telephoning from A to B a moment or two before 12 o’clock and allowing the bell operator 
to listen to the ringing of the bell at A. In the event of the simultaneous breakdown of 
the bell at B and in order to work through the lunch hour to fill the rush order at A, the 
lunch hour at B might be taken by an almost automatic reaction and the observer would 
see the ringing of the bell at A “causing” the egress of the workers at B. It is the absence 
of any model which allows such an argument o be carried so far. In common sense terms 
we would dismiss any causative effect at B of the ringing of the bell at A because the 
workers there cannot hear it. In other words we invoke a mode1 of the transmission of 
the signal which permits it only a certain range and recognized that B lies outside of that 
range. Thus the mere coincidence (even over a long series of observations) of the lunch 
in one place and the ringing of the bell in the other does not convince us that there is any 
relation between the two. A mode1 may therefore be part of the explanation even when 
it is there only implicitly. 
What common sense demands of a mode1 which really “fits” the prototype is that 
there shall be as many connections as possible that tie it back into the prototypical 
situation. The degree of confidence in the model, or more correctly, in the applicability 
of the model, grows in proportion to the growth of detail in this connection. An example 
may serve to illustrate this. In the theory of diffusion and reaction the effectiveness of 
a catalyst particle is defined as the ratio of the actual reaction rate to the reaction rate 
which would obtain if there were no limitation by diffusion. Thus the effectiveness is one 
when there is no diffusion limitation or when the ratio of the reaction rate to the diffusion 
coefficient is very small. Because the reaction is taking place in the interior of the catalyst 
pellet, into which the reactant must diffuse, the reaction may deplete the concentration 
and hence slow the reaction down. If the rate of the reaction is large then the flux into 
the pellet becomes the limiting factor, and there is a rapid falling off of the concentration 
as one goes into the catalyst particle. Since the reaction rate is proportional to that 
concentration, the total reactivity of the pellet is decreased by the diffusive resistance. 
The effectiveness of the catalyst decreases as the reaction rate increases relative to the 
diffusion rate and ultimately it becomes inversely proportional to the so-called Thiele 
Modulus. This modulus is the form L(KID)+, where L is the size of the pellet, K is the 
reaction rate constant and D the diffusion coefficient. Thus the effectiveness, E, is near 
one when + = L(KID)+ is small and E is proportional to l/4 when 4 is large. Now the 
total reaction rate per unit volume is proportional to the product of K and E, which, when 
E is one, is simply proportional to K but, when cf, is large, the total reaction rate is 
proportional to the square root of K. K has the form c.-~:‘I~~ where E is an activation 
energy. R is the gas constant, and T is the absolute temperature. Thus for small values 
of C#I the reaction rate is proportional to e-E/R7 whereas for large vahjes of $ it is propor- 
tional to c’~“‘~‘. It follows that if the logarithm of the reaction rate is plotted against the 
reciprocal temperature, the curve would have a slope of - 1, for large values of the 
reciprocal, whereas for small values of the reciprocal temperature it would have a slope 
of --M (N.B. the temperature is large when its reciprocal is small and vice versa). 
NOW the single observation that, over a sufficiently wide range of temperature, the 
dependence of the re:~~:ti:~~ -a;,: ~YI the reciprocal temperature had this transition from 
slonc j< :c‘ sj;rc I would give one a first degree of confidence in the mode1 of the 
ila:aiyG particle on which this computa?icn is based Such in fact; was the confirmation 
that established the validity of the model ii, its eariy days 1301. Indeed one might go 
further and deduce the ratio of certain physic ,,; quantities by fitting the data by a pair of 
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straight lines of slopes -I% and - 1. However, a much more important confirmation of 
the model would arise if measurements of the diffusion coefficient of the reactant in the 
porous material were made. Alternatively, this diffusion coefficient could be calculated 
and measurements made of the intrinsic rate constant. Then, from the formula for the 
effectiveness that the model gives, the reaction rate could be calculated and compared 
with observation. If these two agree to within the experimental error then one may have 
a much greater degree of confidence in the model. 
This example illustrates the fact that the degree of confidence in the applicability of a 
model is greatly raised when there is a close correspondence with relevant observations 
and the estimation of the parameters in the model has been done independently. If the 
correspondence of the model and observation is used to determine the parameters then 
there is a lesser degree of confirmation of the model for very much less independent 
information has been supplied. Some degree of confirmation still exists, for a totally 
unsuitable model might give no correspondence in such a test as the rate vs reciprocal 
temperature plot for the catalyst particle. 
NOW let US suppose that some particular dynamic behavior has been predicted by the 
model which, it is hoped, can be related to experiment. If the initial conditions of the 
experiment and of the calculated behavior are close one might hope that the subsequent 
behavior of the two would remain close. Such is the case in many instances of stable 
motion, but even a periodic response presents some difficulties. How would one confirm 
a periodic response? First of all it would be necessary, in comparing the ultimate response 
to a forced oscillation to allow any transients in the system to die out, for these would 
be peculiar to the starting conditions. Secondly, one would ignore the phase of the re- 
sulting oscillations, since this would be dependent on the particularities of the start of 
the process. Then one would attempt to match up the wave form, its period and particular 
characteristics. But, even assuming very accurate observations, there are some problems 
with wave forms of sufficiently long period. 
The problem becomes even more acute when one considers so-called chaotic motion. 
“Chaos” in a dynamical system is sometimes defined as a behavior which is neither 
steady, nor periodic, nor asymptotically approaching a periodic behavior. It has received 
much attention from mathematicians and engineers since the discovery of a simple system 
of three ordinary differential equations by Lorentz [401. It has an appearance of random- 
ness which is not of a statistical nature. For in a nonchaotic system subject to certain 
random fluctuations, two trajectories starting close to one another would retain some 
resemblance when allowance was made for the fluctuations due to the random element. 
By contrast, two trajectories starting close together in a chaotic system would, in general, 
bear no resemblance to one another after a sufficient time. The difficulty in comparing 
a prediction with observation lies in the fact that chaotic solutions often coexist with 
other solutions of very long periods or with almost periodic solutions. Thus given a long 
and apparently chaotic record it is impossible to assert that this is not part of an even 
longer periodic solution. Here the role of the model would seem to be crucial in having 
any confidence in the experimental result, or, for that matter, in the model. One would 
need to tie the model to the prototype in as many ways as possible and to show that 
certain ranges of the parameters in the model gave rise to the same kind of irregular 
behavior as could be observed in the real system for more parameter ranges. 
However, there is an even graver philosophical problem which may be illustrated from 
some results in the theory of oscillators. The so-called Van der Pol equation gives rise 
to oscillations either when left to itself or when excited with a simple harmonic or periodic 
impressed excitation. The Van de Pol equation is of the form 2 + f(x>X + x = @(t). 
If b = 0, its solution is a relaxation oscillation, but with excitation has a very complex 
response for certain ranges of the amplitude, b. In the space of x, y = X and f, the time, 
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the solution is represented by a point on a line always proceeding with unit speed in the 
t direction. A return map can be made in which any given point X, y in a plane such as 
t = 0 is mapped into a corresponding point in the x, y plane at t = 27~. This return map 
shows the difference of state at the beginning and end of one period of the excitation and 
is a mapping of the X, y plane into itself. Now it has been shown that the following 
property obtains for certain solutions of this equation. In the X, y plane let us construct 
two regions, small rectangles about two points which will be referred to as A and B. In 
the wandering of the point given by the return map we write down A if the point enters 
the box A and B if, after a sufficient number of periods it enters the box B. This cor- 
responds to noting that the state of the system comes close to some observation point 
corresponding either to the box A or the box B. The size of the box might be a measure 
of the accuracy of possible observation. The motion can be chaotic in the following sense. 
Given any sequence of the letters A and B, such as AABBBABAAABA, it is always 
possible to find a point within the rectangle A such that the sequence of entries into either 
the box A or the box B is as prescribed. What is more, this is true if time is reversed and 
the trajectory is run backwards. It follows that the future is in some sense independent 
of the past for both can be prescribed and then “observed.” Of course there will be many 
other trajectories which have different sequences of entry into the two boxes but, assum- 
ing sufficient powers of observation one can always look for and find any desired result 
in this system. One could almost say that this was a confirmation of the model, namely 
that one could eventually find any required behavior, save for the fact that similar results 
might be shown by a totally different system of equations. 
In turning from physical to social prototypes an interesting distinction arises from the 
very existence of the prototype’s self-consciousness. In this case it may have a model of 
itself and we have to ask what obligation the modeller has to this prior model. For 
example, in modelling the kinship structure of a society must an anthropologist’s model 
though no doubt couched in different terms be faithful to the model that the society has 
of its own structure? Is this fidelity, even when appropriate, of a strict nature, as when 
g(x) is a restriction off(x)? Or can it be much looser, as when the society has a mechanical 
model of itself but the anthropologist builds a statistical model? In one of the places 
where Levi-Strauss draws this distinction 1411 he also points out the dual nature of struc- 
tural studies, or as we might say, interrelationships of models. On the one hand, they 
isolate certain phenomena and bring special methods to bear on them. On the other, they 
seek to construct abstract models which can be put into some sort of isomorphism with 
other models. This isomorphism (at least to the extent that it carries conviction) is held 
to have a certain explanatory power 141, p. 2771. In physical sciences the explanatory 
status of the mechanical analogues in electromagnetic theory-beloved of the 19th century 
English physicists which Duhem found so derisory-is equally debatable, though the 
isomorphism can usually be drawn more convincingly. Perhaps it is having a self-con- 
scious subject of study that most clearly differentiates the social scientist from the natural; 
so that, however much the one may learn from or use the methods of the other, the 
“wirtschaftler” is engaged in a different kind of reflection from the “wissenschaftler.” 
The economist and statistical mechanician may lie down together, but the anthropologist 
will not eat straw like the graph theorist; it is to be hoped that none will hurt and destroy- 
at least not too much. 
6. MODELLING AS CRAFTSMANSHIP 
The emphasis we have put on mathematical modelling as a craft demands a brief, 
further discussion. We believe that it deserves consideration, though what we have to 
say here is preliminary in the strictest sense of the word. What goes on in the modeller’s 
10 R. Am AND M. PENN 
head is not purely formalizable, either in the more abstract terms of Apostol [291 or 
Bunge [27] or in the taxonomic vein of Harre [42]. Nor is it purely subjective, conditioned 
by sociology and psychology as Lakatos [431 and Feyerabend 1441 would have us believe. 
It has more in common with the tacit element in personal knowledge that Polanyi [45,461 
has drawn out. It has structure, it has techniques that can be taught and learned, but 
involves also a personal touch, not only in trivialities (such as the choice of notation) but 
in deeper considerations of skill and suitability. It also involves an element of risk, since 
a wrong turn in the development of a model may lead to its complete stultification. Like 
the furniture maker, the mathematical modeller shapes the several parts of his work and 
fits them together. If one is marred or misshapen it must be reworked or even discarded 
and replaced. 
Pye [47,p.41 has brought out this aspect of craftsmanship very well in his book, The 
Nature & Art qf Workmanship. “If,” he writes, “I must ascribe a meaning to the word 
craftsmanship, I shall say a first approximation that it means simply workmanship using 
any kind of technique or apparatus, in which the quality of the results is not predeter- 
mined, but depends on the judgement, dexterity and care which the maker exercises as 
he works. The essential idea is that the quality of result is continually at risk during the 
process of making; and so 1 shall call this kind of workmanship ‘The workmanship of 
risk’; an uncooth phrase, but at least descriptive.” He goes on to contrast this with the 
workmanship of certainty in which the quality of the product is largely predetermined. 
The latter is exhibited by machine printing in contrast to handwriting, for the control of 
quality is reduced to a few settings once the compositor’s is locked up in the frame. 
The contrast has an interesting parallel in Zeigler’s description of “modelling” and 
“simulation” [481. The former relates the so-called real system to the model and vice 
versa; the latter is the simulation of the model on the computer. The modelling, like 
handwriting, is the workmanship of risk; the simulation, like machine printing, that of 
certainty. If it is argued that the simulation involves the craft of computer programming 
then we may reply that printing involves the compositor’s craft which, like the program- 
mer’s, has elements both of risk and certainty. But once a program is written and running 
the quality of outcome is predetermined, though not prejudged-you may have an in- 
accurate set of numbers as easily as a badly printed newspaper. 
Many a paper and book on mathematical modelling [ 3,4,5,7,11,12,13,481 has its diagram 
of the modelling process in which the relation of the model to the “real” world and the 
iterative nature of the process are portrayed. We have resisted the urge to devise yet 
another, though the temptation to make a culinary triangle [49, see p. 291 out of Bunge, 
Feyerabend and Polanyi (or rather, their positions)% strong. Rather, some of the ideas 
nascent in the craft of mathematical modelling have been discussed in the hope that they 
may contribute something to the philosophers’ ongoing discussion of the concept of a 
model [27-32,41-44,501. 
Between the instrumentalist’s position (that models serve only as computational tools) 
and the realist’s (that models actually tell us something about the real world) there is the 
need for a via media that will do justice to the prehensions of the modeller and to the 
judgement, skill and purposefulness that are tacit in a well-constructed model. Nor is it 
only a matter of what goes on in the modeller’s own head, for modelling is often a 
cooperative and even a transdisciplinary affair. Indeed it may well be that this dialogue 
is the appropriate model for the individual modeller’s internal prehensions. 
In his Mathematician’s Apology, G. H. Hardy claimed victory over A. E. Houseman 
in the matter of priority the latter had ascribed to the critic. To Hardy, as to lesser 
mathematicians of a more applied cast of thought, the creative act, however humble, 
takes precedence over philosophical commentary, however profound. So let it be here. 
As the pages of this journal unfold we shall see the mathematical models aplenty in all 
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their variety and vigor. They will make the best contribution to the evolving concept of 
the mathematical model. 
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